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 Two philosophers walk into a bar. Jerry, who is new to the department, has come 
to the bar for dinner with George after both attending a visiting scholar’s talk. While 
discussing the talk, Jerry says “Well, Sam’s question certainly raises a big hurdle for the 
project.” To this, George interjects, “Wait, you mean Kevin’s question?” Confused, the 
two each recall the Q&A session to remember who asked the really good question that 
quickly erupted into discussion. All things considered, Jerry still believes that Sam was 
the one who asked the question, while George still believes that Kevin was the one who 
asked the question.  
 What we have here is a standard example of epistemic peer disagreement. That is, 
simply put, two people who consider the other to be an epistemic peer are disagreeing 
about something about which they share equal access to the same evidence. In most 
cases, examples like these are followed by questions of what one ought to do about their 
beliefs. Should Jerry lower his confidence that he is right? Or should he retain his belief 
despite the disagreement? Responses to epistemic peer disagreements seek to provide 
recommendations for what we ought to do when we come across them. Insofar as we 
want our beliefs to be true, theories about what we ought to do should guide us closer to 
being correct. These theories are contingent upon the disagreement occurring between 
two genuine epistemic peers.      
 Some argue that genuine cases of epistemic peer disagreement never in fact 
obtain. Louise Antony, when asked by Gary Gutting how she would respond to a 
particular epistemic peer disagreement, stated that “in the real world, there are no 
epistemic peers — no matter how similar our experiences and our psychological 
capacities, no two of us are exactly alike, and any difference in either of these respects 
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can be rationally relevant to what we believe.”1 It seems that even trivial differences in 
experience and attitudes can bias evidential processing in ways that are relevant to our 
beliefs. Antony’s take on epistemic peerhood centers on one dominating feature of the 
literature: epistemic peer disagreement is quite idealized disagreement.  
 For instance, the above example assumes Jerry and George were equally focused 
and aware during the Q&A session, were equally able to hear the discussion, consider the 
other as equally likely to be right, and so forth. It is prima facie understood that they have 
access to the same evidence and are equally likely to be correct in their analysis. What 
seems a realistic epistemic peer disagreement is quickly exposed as another idealized 
case. This brings us to a dilemma: Either epistemic peerhood is impossible, in which case 
we need not identify epistemic peers, or epistemic peers exist, in which case what we 
should do in the face of disagreement with them hinges on being able to identify that they 
meet the conditions for peerhood. I argue in favor of the latter option. I find the criticism 
that the implication of epistemic peer disagreement is highly idealized to be overstated: 
it’s not that epistemic peer disagreement doesn’t exist, but rather that we can’t properly 
identify it because we do not know how to determine our epistemic peers. 
Insofar as we want our view on what to do during disagreement to get us closer to the 
truth, we should first know that the person with whom we disagree is in fact our 
epistemic peer.  
So, rather than follow up the example with ordinary questions of what Jerry ought 
to do regarding his belief, I would like to follow up by asking another question: how do 
we figure out who our epistemic peers are in the first place? Determining what to do in 
                                                             
1 De Cruz, Helen. "Can People Be Genuine Epistemic Peers?" New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science. 
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cases of peer disagreement is irrelevant if we cannot first identify who our epistemic 
peers are. 
Kai Spiekermann addresses a version of the same worry, noting that cases where 
we are actually interacting with an epistemic peer can be beneficial to us in getting our 
own beliefs right, but if we are interacting with someone who we falsely believe is our 
epistemic peer, then it can be damaging to our beliefs as well as a waste of our time. 
Because we are epistemically dependent on others, finding our true epistemic peers is 
important. However, this does not make it easy. Spiekermann writes  
 In practice, identifying one’s true peers is tricky. This is for two reasons. First,  
 even if individuals know what their fundamental interests are, they do not reliably 
 know what these fundamental interests entail for the concrete decision at hand. 
 Second, when observing others they cannot (normally) see what their fundamental 
 interests are, they only see their views about the concrete decisions to be made.”2 
 
I make no claim to have a robust argument for identifying epistemic peers. Instead, I 
identify one avenue that helps get us closer, and that is humor.  
Humor is an undoubtedly useful social tool in a variety of ways. Yet humor is 
unique in its ability to bond or bite. It can just as easily be used to damage relationships 
with others as it can be used to promote social cohesion. For instance, sexist, racist, 
classist, and stereotype-based humor is common and often offensive to joke targets. Of 
course, these jokes rely on relevant backgrounds and attitudes, which imply that humor 
and knowledge are intimately connected. In fact, what we learn about others from what 
they laugh at offers insight into how they do or do not fit into our category of epistemic 
peer because their amusement (or lack thereof) provides information about their attitudes. 
Paying attention to the sense of humor is subsequently important in that it offers a 
                                                             
2 Spiekermann, Kai. “Finding Your True Epistemic Peers: Epistemic Solidarity on Dynamic Networks,” 5-6. 
Working paper cited with permission.  
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platform for understanding evidential processing, which is otherwise inexplicable to 
epistemic peers.  
The aim of this paper is to show that those who share our sense of humor, which I 
call comic peers, are epistemically significant in regards to how we determine our 
epistemic peers. I argue that this species of peerhood is analogous to epistemic peerhood, 
but that comic peerhood ultimately reveals more about others in a way that provides 
access to more evidence that is epistemically advantageous. Since we are better at 
recognizing our comic peers, I believe adopting humor as a guide to likewise determine 
our epistemic peers will alleviate some of the practical problems.  
I will divide the paper into five sections. In the first section, I introduce the 
concepts of comic peer and epistemic peer, and elaborate the practical problems one 
encounters in efforts to identify epistemic peers. In the second section, I elaborate an 
analogy between comic peers and epistemic peers. In the third section, I develop the 
hypothesis that humor and joking provides an important source of evidence regarding the 
second-order beliefs and attitudes that are relevant to determining who’s whose epistemic 
peer. In the fourth section, I argue that because people are generally unable to manipulate 
or hide their genuine responses to humor, and because we are all good at recognizing 
amusement in others, that attention to humor bypasses some of the practical problems 
that afflict attempts to identify epistemic peers. The overall result is an approach to 
epistemic peerhood that goes some distance towards ameliorating the worry that 
approaches to epistemic peer disagreement are necessarily highly idealized, and therefore 
fail to be action-guiding. 
 EPISTEMIC AND COMIC PEERHOOD 
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 Since my first goal is to explore an analogy between epistemic peers and comic 
peers, it is important before moving forward to understand each term. The term comic 
peer generally refers to those who closely and consistently share one’s sense of humor in 
some noticeable way. Two people are comic peers if they share relevant background 
knowledge, relevant attitudes and values, and a similar taste for what they find funny. 
Background knowledge is required for much of humor, so being comic peers means 
sharing significant background knowledge. They share attitudes about what is acceptable 
joking material, and they may frequently laugh at jokes for the same reasons.  
Similarly, they laugh at the same categories of funny things, such as others’ 
mishaps, puns, nonsense humor, anti-jokes, and so forth. Just as epistemic peer groups 
break off based on their relative expertise, comic peer groups can break off based on their 
tastes for particular kinds of humor. For instance, my friend and I may be comic peers in 
that we share an affinity for witty comebacks and sarcasm, but not so based on our 
differing attitudes towards puns or dead baby jokes. Comic peers are fairly easy to 
identify.  
Epistemic peer, on the other hand, is a frequently used term with many distinct 
conceptions, and this makes them harder to identify. Keep in mind that the nature of the 
term centers on epistemic peer disagreement, which involves considerations on what one 
ought to do when she discovers that she disagrees with someone she considers an 
epistemic peer. Here, it is natural to think that a resolution should be sought after, 
whereas it is not so natural to seek out reasons explaining why two people did not laugh 
at the same joke.  
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To start, the most basic notion of epistemic peers emphasizes possessing the same 
epistemic virtues and having access to the same evidence. Gary Gutting first used the 
term to identify those who are alike in regards to intelligence, thoroughness, honesty, and 
other epistemic virtues.
3
 Thomas Kelly expands on this, stating that two people are 
epistemic peers with respect to a question if and only if they are equals regarding their 
familiarity with evidence and arguments which bear on that question.
4
 David Enoch 
defines an epistemic peer as “someone who is…as likely as you are to get things right (on 
matters of the relevant kind).” This conception of evidence seems primarily constituted 
by what one knows, pertaining to shared evidence, and this includes knowing that 
someone else is equally likely to know.  
Now, these conditions for epistemic peerhood may in fact seem sufficient for 
identifying epistemic peers. After all, over time we learn the trustworthiness and 
credibility of others, and in some cases, the shared access to evidence is clear. Yet the 
problem that arises from too minimal a definition is that it puts us in a position to 
consider too many people to be our epistemic peers. If the primary criteria are shared 
access and similar judgment, then there would be many instances where we’d have so 
many epistemic peers that it is no longer epistemically relevant or advantageous. 
Consider the internet. Anyone who has access to the internet is sharing access to the same 
things as everyone else with internet access. And even the internet lends itself to narrow 
epistemic communities. Consider, for example, The Onion’s satirical article “Harry 
Potter Books Spark Rise In Satanism Among Children” back in the summer of 2000.5 
                                                             
3 Gutting, Gary. "Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism," 83. 
4
 Kelly, Thomas. "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 174. 
5 Harry Potter Books Spark Rise In Satanism Among Children." The Onion - America's Finest News Source. 
2000 
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This article stirred up much trouble among communities who believed it to be true. While 
this was before The Onion was such a well-known satirical news agency, there are still 
instances today where people mistakenly believe their stories. In fact, misinterpreting 
satire as truth seems to be a common epistemic failing among some internet users. As we 
can see, even given prima facie reason for thinking someone else shares access to the 
same body of evidence, we are still left with the problem of determining who our 
epistemic peers are. 
While access to the same evidence and shared epistemic virtues are the core 
features of epistemic peer definitions, another class of the term demands more. This class 
of definitions relies on evidential processing. This addition amplifies the difficulties in 
identifying one’s peers. Jonathan Matheson emphasizes two types of equality pertinent to 
accounts of epistemic peers. One is equality in evidential possession and the other is 
equality in evidential processing. Simply put, two individuals are in equal terms of 
evidential possession regarding some particular proposition just in case they have equally 
good evidence pertaining to said proposition, and two individuals are in equal terms of 
evidential processing regarding some particular proposition just in case they are equal in 
how well they are able to handle evidence related to forming a belief about said 
proposition.
6
 It does not matter how they handle the information, but rather that they are 
equally good at handling the information and thus equally likely to do so correctly. This 
type of evidence seems constituted by one’s phenomenological state, or how things seem 
to us based on the shared evidence we process. Yet this merely elicits another question: 
how is one to judge that others are evidentially processing things in the same way as 
someone else? 
                                                             
6 Matheson, Jonathan. "Disagreement and Epistemic Peers." Oxford Handbooks Online.  
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Axel Gelfert holds that “we demand of epistemic peers not only that they be as 
reliable and well informed as us, but also that they share, by and large, our commitments 
as to what it is important to know. Epistemic peers should not only get their facts right, 
but should also agree on which facts it is important to get right.”7 This class of definitions 
goes a bit above and beyond in that they emphasize the importance of processing 
evidence rather than merely possessing and accessing evidence. This is a reasonable 
expansion to the basic term, but it drives full force into the practical problem of being 
unable to identify our epistemic peers. Amidst discussion of a disagreement, we may 
learn some things about how the other interprets the relevant evidence, but in some 
instances we don’t even have access to the details of our own evidential processing, so it 
remains insufficient. 
 So if the additional condition on epistemic peerhood is processing evidence in the 
same way, or equally as well, then the primary hurdle is that we lack the ability to 
understand others’ evidential processing. The only way over this particular hurdle is to 
figure out a way that helps us understand this about others. I find that our ability to 
identify comic peers entails some insight into others’ processing, which offers some hope 
for finding our epistemic peers. 
AN ANALOGY 
It would be a pretty wild claim to suggest that someone may be an epistemic peer 
on all accounts. Individuals’ specializations and expertise vary. Consequently, what 
happens is that our epistemic peers seem to be categorized in certain ways. For example, 
I have those who I deem an epistemic peer in regards to philosophy, and these are 
                                                             
7 Gelfert, Axel. "Who is an Epistemic Peer?" 514.  
Harrison | 10 
 
different people than those I deem epistemic peers in regards to literature, pop culture, 
sports, and so forth. 
 While these notions of epistemic peers suggest the breaking into categories, I 
want to be clear that a comic peer is not merely a category of epistemic peer in the same 
way that my philosophy epistemic peers are. I believe that comic peers are another 
species of peer entirely. One central characteristic to epistemic peerhood relies on having 
equal access to the same evidence, which likewise appears in comic peerhood as physical 
presence, in-group terminology, awareness of certain attitudes, and so forth. Drawing the 
analogy with Matheson’s terms, it seems that evidential possession would include the 
knowledge and beliefs required to find something funny. Tracking who frequently shares 
feelings of mirth within the same in-groups indicates who shares your evidential 
possession. It seems that we track this in the same manner that we track others’ 
credibility in the epistemic case. As I discuss philosophy with my classmates, I learn that 
we share access to the same evidence, and thus conclude that they are my epistemic peers 
concerning philosophy. In the same way, as we joke with others, we learn to what extent 
we share background knowledge based on the other person’s presence in either the in-
group or out-group of the joke. If being in the in-group means getting the joke and getting 
the joke means sharing evidential possession, then, in theory, repeatedly being in the 
same in-group as someone else implies a consistent shared evidential possession.  
It seems then that evidential processing would manifest as the shared feeling of 
mirth among those who find a joke or bit funny. This would be those who get the joke, 
and respond in the same manner. Getting the joke shows shared evidential possession, but 
responding to the joke in the same way implies shared evidential processing – at least to a 
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certain extent. Responding to jokes necessarily elicits one’s attitudes towards the subject. 
If I get a joke, but do not find it funny, then I am equally as likely to identify sharing a 
sense of humor to those who also get the joke and do not find it funny. What is important 
here is that they are processing the evidence of the joke in the same way that I am. In this 
case, this suggests that they share the same attitudes as me regarding some particular 
subject. Thus, by joking, we gain access to new evidence, namely the attitudes of others.  
In the broader sense of epistemic peer, having equal access to evidence in the case 
of humor would involve things like hearing the joke, being present for the funny episode, 
having the background knowledge required, being in the right state of mind, and so forth. 
Essentially, equal access to evidence regarding funny things is being in the appropriate 
position to be able to find it funny. And just as the epistemic discussion proceeds into 
what to do during disagreement or when one simply does not know something, the comic 
discussion heads down the same path. Let me say more. Imagine that a professor has 
changed what time the class is meeting for an upcoming class, but I forgot to write it 
down. I think that instead of starting at 2:00, the class is supposed to start at 2:30, but I do 
not know for sure. In this case, I will likely ask someone who has access to the evidence I 
had: someone else in the class. 
 An analogous case illustrates one way that knowing who shares our sense of 
humor is valuable. For this, I will observe three categories of jokes that each rely on 
different levels of understanding. For one example, say I am with a group of friends and 
some people I am just meeting. Someone makes the following Harry Potter joke:  
“The barman says, ‘We don’t serve time-travelers here.’ Hermione walks into The 
Three Broomsticks with a time-turner.” 
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Imagine that I’ve neither read nor watched Harry Potter. I may be confused by the “The 
Three Broomsticks” and “time-turner,” but I can still know that this is a joke. 8 This sort 
of inverted joke structure provides enough information for me to laugh along and avoid 
being outed for not being familiar with Harry Potter.
 9
  
 Not all jokes can be recognized in this way. Some categories of jokes require 
specific knowledge or the joke will be missed. Puns are an excellent example of this. If I 
am studying abroad in a foreign country where I don’t know the language and someone 
makes a clever pun, I would not know something clever or funny has happened at all. I 
am missing the necessary knowledge required for me to recognize that someone made a 
pun. Another category of joke requires some background knowledge as well as 
knowledge about attitudes. For example, someone jokes “The thing about German food is 
that no matter how much you eat, an hour later you’re hungry for power.”10 The audience 
in this case need not endorse or possess the attitude represented to find the joke funny, 
but they must be aware of the underlying stereotypes. The last category of jokes does 
require the audience to share the attitude of the joke in order to find it funny. For 
example: 
 Q: What is easier to pick up the heavier it gets?  
A: Women.   
 
These jokes rely on the affective disposition of the audience. Many other sexist and racist 
jokes work this way.  
                                                             
8For those who don’t get the Harry Potter terms: a time-turner is an object used by one of the main 
characters, Hermione, which allows her to travel back in time. The Three Broomsticks is the name of a pub 
in the fictional village of Hogsmeade. Basically, this is a common inverted joke that has been translated 
into a fictional world by adopting its language.  
9
 To which someone would almost certainly reply: “You don't get my Harry Potter jokes? There must be 
something RON with you.” 
10 Cohen, Ted. Jokes, 21. 
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 So here’s a conundrum: I want to avoid being called out for not understanding the 
references because I want to fit in, but I also want to make sure that I am not laughing at 
something that I would not be laughing at should I understand the reference. That is, I 
want to stay true to my own sense of humor by expressing my true attitudes. What if the 
joke was somehow offensive, and if I understood it, I would not be laughing? The best 
thing to do is to quickly defer to our comic peers. I ought to look to someone I know who 
commonly shares my sense of humor, but also gets this particular reference.
11
 Similarly, 
if my comic peer does not laugh, then I may not as well.
 12
  Sometimes we rely on our 
peers to flag when something funny has happened, sometimes to explain jokes to us, and 
sometimes to tell whether or not we share the right attitudes to find the joke funny.   
Thus, comic peers are analogous to epistemic peers in that they too carve out 
communities that share evidence, background knowledge, and even attitudes. Just as our 
epistemic position determines our epistemic peers, our position within joking situations 
over time determines our comic peers, who we then may turn to for clarification in 
ambiguous cases. Additionally, just as our epistemic peers may reinforce our beliefs or 
knowledge, our comic peers may reinforce our own taste for humor and what we find 
funny.  One thing to consider, of course, is that people find things funny for different 
reasons. It seems then that the sort of information that we get from sharing jokes is 
perhaps more valuable diachronically, over a range of joke exchanges and funny 
episodes, and across a wide variety of contexts. In this way, we gain a better 
understanding when someone actually does find things funny for the same reason as us.  
                                                             
11 I realize that one may argue in this instance that the person is more analogous to a ‘comic superior,’ but 
I don’t think this is correct. In fact, this example alludes to where the epistemic peer and comic peer 
accounts diverge.   
12 Remember: in this example I am looking to someone I know who ordinarily shares my sense of humor 
and who I know gets the reference.  
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IN-GROUPS AND OUT-GROUPS 
Now I will put forth the hypothesis that humor and joking provides an important 
source of evidence regarding evidential processing that is relevant to determining who’s 
whose epistemic peer. It’s obvious that humor plays a large role in bonding with others. 
What gets neglected, however, is that it accomplishes this while relying on the existence 
of an out-group; that is, others who are not in on the joke, are somehow excluded, or seen 
as being targeted. This happens in a variety of ways. In some cases, the out-group is 
obviously targeted, as seen in sexist, racist, and stereotype humor. In other cases, the out-
group may be less obvious, such as jokes about the human condition, jokes about death, 
or conversational jokes where everyone around may be laughing even if they do not get 
the joke. Further, there are outlier cases where the target of the joke may find comfort 
within the in-group despite being targeted by the joke. For an example, just think of a 
gullible friend; their willingness to trust their friends is often exploited for the 
entertainment of the group. This problem of trust shows how we may laugh at the same 
thing for different reasons. The friends are laughing because the gullible friend believes 
them when they say that “gullible” isn’t in the dictionary, while the gullible friend, once 
made aware, may be laughing at her own fault in believing the others. 
I suspect that what is fundamental to each of these aforementioned cases is the 
way in which we subconsciously determine both who is in on the joke and who is being 
excluded. I believe this acts as an epistemic tracker that helps situate oneself into the 
group dynamic, in addition to learning others’ sense of humor. Observing where the in-
group and out-group are divided over time informs us of our comic peers. With that in 
mind, this suggests that the in-group and out-group effect of humor is actually an 
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important epistemic feature. Observance of these groups tells us more than who our 
comic peers may be; it provides relevant insight into how others process the subjects, 
which assists in identifying epistemic peers. 
 I will now turn to this grouping feature in order to illustrate how this happens. To 
begin, I would like to lay the foundation for understanding what happens within in-
groups during a joke or funny episode.  There are two types of humor to consider here: 
situational humor and joking. Situational humor is a sort of play frame adopted by those 
involved, which relies on a backdrop of in-group knowledge and uses familiar verbal 
features and non-verbal communication. Best put by Diana Boxer and Florencia Cortés-
Corde: “In situational humor ‘being there’ becomes a very important part of ‘getting 
it.’”13 Naturally, this is a core feature as it relies on the context of the situation. Examples 
of this include teasing or some funny mishap that brings about an inside joke. To be in 
the in-group of situational humor is to be both present and appropriately situated in the 
play frame; that is, to adopt a playful attitude which is conducive to humor. Let’s 
consider some examples. Here’s one that creates an inside joke.  
Some friends are walking back from the gym on campus when one woman, Sally, 
trips and falls rather dramatically. She launches forward before her friends can 
help prevent her fall. Immediately, her friends start laughing and as she lies on the 
ground, she exclaims “Oooooh, I took a tumble!” Her friends begin laughing 
harder alongside her. Then, for the next couple of weeks the joke “Sally took a 
tumble!” emerges as an inside joke among those who were there. 14   
 
This is a primary example that illustrates the importance of being present during 
situational humor. All of the people who witnessed Sally fall are in on the joke. Of 
course, it may be possible to expand the joke to include others, but this does not always 
                                                             
13
 Boxer, Diana, and Florencia Cortés-Conde. "From Bonding to Biting: Conversational Joking and Identity 
Display," 277.  
14 Thanks to my friend, Calli Pugh, for taking the tumble that inspired this example.  
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work. Explaining something funny will most certainly kill the humor, hence the common 
dismissal expression: “You just had to be there.” Likewise, anyone reading this example 
likely does not find it very funny. In excluding others, this type of humor further bonds 
those who are involved. Boxer and Cortés-Corde describe the out-group in these 
scenarios as “absent others.” Episodes like this bring about special in-group terminology 
that bonds those involved and unites them against these “absent others.”15 
 An example of situational humor that potentially divides those present is teasing. 
Boxer and Cortés-Corde’s research captures well how friendly teasing ranges from 
bonding to biting. Certainly everyone has had their feelings hurt by a comment that was 
intended to be teasing and playful. But what goes wrong that causes genuine teasing to 
bite? Most likely, it is insufficient or ambiguous play frame. Boxer and Cortés-Corde 
categorize this phenomenon, writing that: 
The need for a clear play frame is as necessary in [situational humor] as in joke 
telling, but intentional or unintentional ambiguity due to a lack of highly 
conventionalized means for signaling the ‘play’ frame can be problematic…. not 
getting it might result in a possible conflict. Misunderstandings and/or misfires 
are, thus, more likely and imply increased risk beyond the level of loss of face.
16
  
 
In the case of teasing-gone-wrong, it seems primarily caused by someone misattributing 
play frame to someone else. And since the nature of teasing relies on some truth about the 
person, in the absence of joke-signaling, teasing can be particularly dangerous to 
relationships with others. For example, I was texting a group of friends from college 
recently, joking about going back to get different bachelor’s degrees. We each listed 
another major that we would want, deliberately picking ones that would be “easier.” One 
friend said to another “don’t change your major…you already did nothing.” 
                                                             
15 Ibid., 281. 
16 Ibid., 278. 
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Unfortunately, this was a bite. Rather than feeling in on the joke, the receiving friend was 
offended. And since I knew she was upset by the comment, it was difficult for me to find 
it funny too. Thus, those involved were divided by teasing-gone-wrong. If determining 
our comic peers relies on tracking responses to situational humor, then episodes like these 
can be dividing. Those hurt or unamused by the teasing comment, for whatever reason, 
could interpret this as the other misattributing play frame or thinking that she may require 
less play signals to joke about something. As a result, this could be points against her as a 
comic peer, especially if it happens regularly.  
The next type of humor to consider is joking. When a joke is told, two important 
things happen among the audience. First, one either gets the joke or does not. Then, those 
who get the joke either find it funny or do not. When presented this way, the essential 
element of being part of the in-group is that one gets the joke.
17
 Of course, those who get 
the joke, but find it problematic or harsh or merely not amusing, may dissociate 
themselves from the in-group. Regardless, there remains underlying information required 
to get the joke, and this suggests an inseparable relationship between humor and 
knowledge. 
 In his book, Jokes, Ted Cohen frequently draws attention to these feelings of 
intimacy and in-groupness that are created by joking. His primary thesis revolves around 
hearers of jokes importing some form of their own background knowledge, beliefs, or 
attitudes into the joke. The joke-teller then may exploit this background knowledge for 
comedic effect. Cohen says that “This fact is a key to understanding the insinuating 
                                                             
17 There may be some exceptions to this, such as a group of friends teasing their gullible friend. While the 
gullible friend may not get the joke, her and their shared laughter may still promote feelings of inclusion 
and in-groupness as opposed to her being excluded in some way. Additionally, heavily targeted jokes, 
such as racist or sexist ones, are context-dependent on who makes up the in-group.   
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quality of jokes, a way in which they force their audiences to join in the joke.”18 
According to this account, those who get the joke all share some form of background 
knowledge without which they could not get the joke. Cohen seems right about this, and 
he calls these jokes conditional because they are conditional on the audience providing 
something to either get the joke or find it amusing. When this involves background 
beliefs or knowledge, Cohen calls the joke hermetic. As a result, strongly hermetic jokes 
require audiences with substantial knowledge of a subject.  Let us examine some jokes. 
Consider the following:  
 Q: Want to hear a feminist joke? 
 A: - that’s not funny!19 
 
In order to get this joke, one must be familiar with the cultural stereotype of the angry 
feminist who is unamused by jokes at her expense. If one were unfamiliar with this 
reputation feminists have for being no-nonsense, then they may merely be confused by 
the answer to the question. They would not get the joke. While many likely get the joke, 
not all may find it amusing. This is a great example of how another’s attitudes towards 
the subject are revealed. We may ask what attitudes they possess that prevent them from 
finding the joke funny. Consider another example: 
 Q: Why don’t snakes bite lawyers? 
 A: Professional courtesy   
 
This one also relies on a common stereotype. The joker is exploiting the hearers’ 
knowledge about how lawyers are often depicted as cunning and snake-like, deceiving 
those around them for their own personal gain.   
                                                             
18 Cohen, Ted. Jokes, 3-4. 
19 Thanks to Zach Auwerda for this joke.  
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These two jokes function in much the same way. For a perhaps more nuanced 
example, recall Lewis Carroll’s famous riddle presented by the Mad-Hatter, who 
repeatedly asks “Why is a raven like a writing desk?”20 Carroll doesn’t provide an answer 
for us, but many may be amused by the popular response that “Poe wrote on both.” This 
response relies on layers of wordplay, and surely this response makes no sense if one 
does not know that Edgar Allan Poe was a 19
th
 century author and that one of his most 
famous poems is titled “The Raven.” This particular example highlights well how merely 
getting the joke is sufficient for admission into the in-group. As this riddle relies on a pun 
for its answer, some hearers may be little more than amused. Thus, this riddle and 
response carves out two groups within those who get the joke; those who find puns funny 
and those who do not.  
 Contrast the following strong hermetic joke by Cohen with those mentioned 
above: 
One day a paleographer came into his classics department in great excitement. 
“There has been an earthshaking discovery,” he announced. “The Iliad and the 
Odyssey were not written by Homer, but by some other Greek with the same 
name.”21 
 
This joke requires one to have knowledge about problems of reference in the philosophy 
of language as well as some information about ancient Greek literature. Without this 
required knowledge, the hearer does not have the access to find the joke funny. This 
would be a case where it might be helpful to observe a well-known comic peer who has 
the epistemic advantage of getting the joke. Of course, forcing laughter to cover gaps in 
knowledge is harder to do than one may think, but more on that later.  
                                                             
20 Carroll, Lewis. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland; And, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found 
There, 57. As an aside, in this version, Kristine Moruzi offers another clever response: “Because it can 
produce a few notes, though they are very flat; and that it is never put with the wrong end in front!” 
21 Cohen, Ted. Jokes, 16. 
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While joking, one must have an implicit acknowledgement of this hearer-
providing effect, which the speaker can then exploit for the joke. According to Cohen, 
this is the foundation for intimacy that will develop should their joke succeed as those 
around join in the shared response. Cohen writes of this in-group intimacy: 
It is the shared sense of those in a community. The members know that they are in 
this community, and they know that they are joined there by one another. When 
the community is focused on a joke, the intimacy has two constituents. The first 
constituent is a shared set of beliefs, dispositions, prejudices, preferences, et 
cetera – a shared outlook on the world, or at least part of an outlook. The second 
constituent is a shared feeling – a shared response to something. The first 
constituent can be cultivated and realized without jokes. So can the second 
constituent, but with jokes, the second constituent is amplified by the first, and 
this is a very curious and wonderful fact about jokes.
22
 
 
So Cohen finds characteristic of these fleeting joke communities that they necessarily 
have a shared outlook about the relevant subject and that this in turn encourages a shared 
feeling. I will adopt this notion as representative of the in-groups of jokes.  
As a quick aside, I want to point out that we learn just as much from those who 
are not necessarily our comic peers. Those in the out-group provide epistemically 
relevant features that have nothing to do with one’s sense of humor. So what happens 
when one does not get the joke? There are a few situations to consider here. Theories of 
laughter emphasize the ways in which we tend to laugh together. One is more likely to 
laugh with others around than alone. This is why many TV shows rely on laugh tracks to 
signal laughter among the audience. If a friend tells a strong hermetic joke that all but one 
person gets, then that person may laugh anyways. They are likely not experiencing any 
genuine feelings of mirth, but there are a couple explanations for their laughter. They 
may be laughing awkwardly as a knee-jerk reaction to seeing the others’ laughter, or they 
may choose to laugh in an attempt to avoid being excluded. This is a sort of different case 
                                                             
22 Ibid., 28.  
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where we are privy to a person’s desire to be in on the joke, which reveals a particular 
attitude they possess.  
Because laughter occurs for many reasons other than mirth, identifying the in-
group and out-group of jokes and bits is sometimes complicated. However, it is 
epistemically helpful to identify the out-group of jokes because by not laughing or not 
getting the joke, one reveals gaps in their own knowledge, beliefs, or background. These 
gaps and the revealed attitudes that come along with them grant us new evidence to 
consider about our peers.  
SIGNALING AND NEW EVIDENCE 
 I have argued that sharing attitudes helps evaluate our comic peers. In some cases, 
people manipulate their response to something funny. One advantage to my view is that, 
ultimately, we are bad at faking or hiding our genuine responses to humor. In fact, 
because we are good at recognizing amusement in others, paying attention to humor 
bypasses some of the practical problems that afflict attempts at identifying epistemic 
peers.  First, I will show when this may occur, and then I will highlight an important 
difference in facial muscles that assists us in recognizing non-genuine responses.  
In their book, Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse Engineer the Mind, Hurley, 
Dennett, and Adams build a cognitive account of humor, revealing it to share qualities 
with feelings of insight. Because of their interests in the cognitive processes behind 
finding things funny, they argue that it is crucial to understand and evaluate laughter both 
as a genuine response to humorous stimuli, and as a behavioral response to a variety of 
other things, such as awkward laughter, fake laughter, and laughing because others laugh. 
Consequently, they shift focus to incorporate the ways we deliberately react to avoid 
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exclusion from the joke. They write “You may, without knowing it, acquire a habit of 
laughing when others laugh, just to make them believe that you understand what is going 
on, even when you have not received the stimulus that evoked their laughter.”23 Further, 
they suggest that one may stifle laughter that would reveal limits of “cognitive mastery” 
and exaggerate laughter to express some mastery that one may not have.  One clear 
example of this is the case of laughing at a strong hermetic joke which one does not have 
the appropriate understanding to find funny. Fake-laughing at the joke attempts to trick 
those around to believing that she too gets the joke, thus avoiding being called out, 
having the joke painfully explained, or being openly excluded from the shared in-group 
feeling.  
 Try as we might to fake or stifle our laughter, our faces ultimately give us away. 
French anatomist, Guillaume Duchenne, studied the expressions of emotions by 
stimulating facial muscles with electric currents. He found that smiles are different when 
accompanied by positive emotions and that the difference involves involuntary use of a 
particular facial muscle. What’s now known as a Duchenne smile (or laughter) involves 
both the zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi. The zygomatic major is the voluntary 
muscle involved that raises the corners of the mouth, whereas the orbicularis oculi is an 
involuntary contraction that raises the cheeks and produces a crow’s feet appearance by 
the eyes. It is this involuntary contraction that produces the genuine Duchenne smile. 
Because it is involuntary, any forced or fake smile (as known as a non-Duchenne smile), 
lacks the use of the orbicularis oculi, instead relying only the zygomatic major. So despite 
some people’s confident assertions that they are exceptionally good at ‘fake laughing,’ it 
                                                             
23 Hurley, Matthew M., Daniel C. Dennett, and Reginald B. Adams. Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-
Engineer the Mind, 268.  
Harrison | 23 
 
seems that we are actually quite good at noticing this difference in others. In fact, studies 
have shown that babies at just ten months old will offer false smiles to strangers, but 
Duchenne smiles to their mothers, Duchenne smiles in yearbook photos correlate to 
general positive emotions, happier marriages, and even longevity many years later, and 
Duchenne smiles act as signals for cooperation and altruism.
24
   
 On the other hand, finding something legitimately funny and laughing as a result 
of mirth also reveals to others one’s underlying knowledge, attitudes, and biases. 
Laughing in this way will “unintentionally reveal something of strategic interest about 
your knowledge (and your largely unconscious methods of putting it to use).”25 It is 
evident that laughing at something reveals information about a person that is unique in 
this way. What a person laughs at reveals something that others may never have known. 
Hurley, Dennett, and Adams capture this best, writing: 
 Laughter is a hard-to-fake signal of cognitive prowess – and weakness. It is not 
 surprising, then, that humor-detection has come to play a central role in human 
 communication. Aside from fabricated (non-Duchenne) laughter and stifled 
 laughter, our every roar and giggle broadcasts something about our cognitive 
 abilities and knowledge.
26
 
 
It is our ability to discern fake from genuine laughter that allows us better access to the 
thoughts, opinions, and attitudes revealed by joking, and it is this notion of what humor 
reveals that suggests it is a useful approach to identifying epistemic peers.  
ALL-ACCESS PASS 
 I mentioned earlier that comic peers are not merely a type of epistemic peer, but 
rather another species of peer entirely. The significance of the comic peer is that they 
                                                             
24 Jaffe, Eric. "The Psychological Study of Smiling." 
25
 Hurley, Matthew M., Daniel C. Dennett, and Reginald B. Adams. Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-
Engineer the Mind, 265. 
26 Ibid., 267. 
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exhibit more than merely knowledge. They provide insight about sources of second-order 
evidence, namely attitudes, values, and biases. Gaining access to this second-order 
evidence seems best done in a comic way, especially since getting the joke often relies on 
knowing the joke-teller’s attitudes. Consequently, I think that humor is an invaluable 
guide because identifying our comic peers puts us in a better position to then evaluate if 
they too are, in some capacity, our epistemic peers. 
 One crucial observation to make is that comedy is contextual. The same thing told 
by one person may be funny, but someone else saying the exact same thing may not be 
funny at all. Because humor is such a drastic social phenomenon, a joke-teller’s social 
position matters as well as the audience’s. Comics are well aware of this. They may alter 
a set to accommodate different political views, race, class, age, sex, and so forth 
depending on their audience. This social relevance plays a large role in identifying values 
in others. Let’s consider some examples. 
 Imagine a woman telling the following joke: 
Everyone says the world would be better off if it was run by women. Sure, maybe 
there wouldn't be violence and territorial conquests fueled by male testosterone, 
but instead, we'd have a bunch of jealous countries that aren't talking to each 
other. 
 
Certainly some people find this joke distasteful merely reading it. Told by a woman, 
however, one may be more likely to find it funny because in telling the joke, the woman 
is poking fun at the jealous woman trope.
27
 So, when a woman laughs at this joke, it 
seems that it is because her attitude matches that of the joke-teller. In fact, based on the 
woman’s delivery of the joke, anyone may laugh by sharing this ‘it’s funny because it’s 
true’ attitude. However, imagine the same joke being told by a man. Suddenly, the vibe 
                                                             
27 Of course, this may not always be the case as women can also exhibit sexist attitudes. However, the 
point is to show how a woman telling this joke yields different results than a man telling it.  
Harrison | 25 
 
of the joke shifts from a narrative observation of sexism to possible disparagement of 
women. Much of this relies on existent power structures. Because the man telling the joke 
is not part of the target of the joke and comes from a privileged position, it is more 
difficult to find it funny; unless, of course, you share the man’s attitude, which is 
admittedly sexist.  
 This suggests a highly contextual and sophisticated way of following what others 
find funny. In addition to observing genuine laughter and amused responses, there are 
social layers that elicit attitudes towards the topic. Disparagement humor is prevalent, and 
much research has been done to consider its effects on why people find it amusing. In 
their work on the literature, Mark A. Ferguson and Thomas E. Ford find that “It appears 
that such humor is most amusing to those individuals whose personal or social identity is 
enhanced in the particular social context.”28 Perhaps a similar observation could be made 
about women who make disparaging jokes at their own expense. Perhaps in drawing 
attention to these real underlying sexist attitudes and problems, women are hoping to 
expose the negative attitude as ridiculous in an effort to promote positive change. They 
are, in a way, satirizing sexist attitudes. Tina Fey, for instance, mocked female 
Hollywood standards in several of her jokes while hosting the Golden Globes. Back to 
back years, she joked: 
 “Matthew McConaughey did amazing work this year. For his role in Dallas 
 Buyers Club, he lost 45 pounds. Or what actresses call: ‘being in a movie.’” and 
 “Steve Carell’s Foxcatcher look took two hours to put on, including his hair 
 styling and makeup. Just for comparison, it took me three hours today to prepare 
 for my role as human woman.”  
                                                             
28 Ferguson, Mark A., and Thomas E. Ford. "Disparagement Humor: A Theoretical and Empirical Review of 
Psychoanalytic, Superiority, and Social Identity Theories," 306. 
Harrison | 26 
 
Now, to understand disparaging humor is an entirely different project, and I don’t intend 
to discuss that here. What I want to illustrate is merely that there are some jokes that 
require proper attitudes to find funny.
29
  
 Another way that attitudes and values manifest in regards to one’s sense of humor 
is what one is willing to joke or laugh about. To an extent, any time someone makes a 
joke, they are signaling that something is permissible to joke about. For an example, just 
think of a friend who finds nothing off-limits for joking material. This would be the 
friend sitting at the bar when a particularly annoying song comes on who declares “this 
song makes me want to hang myself.” First, this tells everyone else that this is 
permissible joking material to the speaker. Second, it can be distancing to others whose 
attitudes or values conflict with the nature of the joke. Even without finding the joke 
funny, they are learning something important about the friend who told the joke. 
Similarly, the speaker learns something important about those not laughing. To them, it 
signals something they find impermissible to joke about. A common example of this is 
rape jokes. Many people either refuse to or simply don’t find them funny in any capacity. 
This reveals important values to everyone else.  
 To summarize, I have tried to show that humor reveals background knowledge, 
attitudes, values, and biases, which are all relevant to identifying our comic peers. While 
we may share some background knowledge that is required to find something funny, this 
alone is insufficient for comic peerhood. We must also consistently share the necessary 
attitudes and values required to find the kinds of things funny that we find funny, and we 
must share a certain taste in humor. For these reasons, comic peerhood reveals a great 
deal about the background beliefs and attitudes of others that can be used to identify our 
                                                             
29 Recall the three categories that rely on different degrees of understanding mentioned above. 
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epistemic peers. We have reason to think that those who are not our comic peers are 
unlikely to be our epistemic peers, and those who are our comic peers can be more 
reliably evaluated as potential epistemic peers. 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 In this paper, I have stressed the need to address the real problem of identifying 
one’s epistemic peers in order for debates about what to do in the face of epistemic peer 
disagreement to progress. I proposed that humor presents a possible solution because we 
are better able to carve out comic communities and to identify those who share our sense 
of humor than we are able to identify our epistemic peers.  Because of the complexity of 
in-groups, out-groups, and types of humor, we must learn who our comic peers are over a 
wide variety of contexts. Yet comic peers are still easier to identify in real life, which 
implies that humor seems the best avenue for getting us closer to identifying our 
epistemic peers.  
 Those who are our comic peers are essentially more likely to be our epistemic 
peers in some capacity. At least, they are in a better position to be more accurately 
evaluated epistemically. This doesn’t mean that humor is only helpful through identifying 
comic peers, however. There are extreme cases where humor alone is obviously helpful. 
Think of the homeless person who seems to be laughing at nothing. It is obvious from 
this case that one could eliminate him from both categories of peers. In less obvious 
cases, we can investigate with humor. For instance, if we are unsure that someone could 
be an epistemic peer in some way, perhaps we ought to make a joke. As shown, this is a 
quick way to get some indication about a person’s background knowledge, attitudes, and 
values. In fact, we can even manipulate what we learn by what we joke about. If you 
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suspect someone to be racist, sexist, or homophobic, a good way to find out is to make a 
joke that would elicit a particular response from someone who is. This uses humor to 
quickly gain epistemic insight without necessarily knowing whether or not the person is a 
comic peer. 
 One may worry that humor can be misleading, and that we in fact get a lot wrong 
about interpreting others’ attitudes and reasons for laughing and so forth. Unfortunately, 
humor isn’t a perfect guide. People do find things funny for a variety of reasons, and they 
may disagree with others about what makes something funny. And the attitudes and 
values elicited can be misunderstood or misinterpreted. Even successful comedians 
sometimes worry that some people in their audience have the wrong idea about their 
attitudes and values. Dave Chappelle, for example, abruptly left comedy for ten years 
amidst a successful career. One instance that influenced his decision to leave comedy 
involved a crew member laughing at a sketch in a way Chappelle did not expect. It was a 
racially-charged sketch, and Chappelle recalled his realization, saying: 
  “Somebody on set that was white laughed in such a way… I know the difference 
 when people are laughing with me and people are laughing at me, and it was the 
 first time I ever got a laugh that I was uncomfortable with. Not just 
 uncomfortable, but like ‘should I fire this person?’”30  
 
He realized that what he was hoping to convey in the sketch was not what was going to 
be interpreted by everyone. So, of course, humor cannot capture attitudes and values 
perfectly. But I see no reason why we ought to dismiss its advantages merely because it 
sometimes gets things wrong. One problem with the conditions for epistemic peerhood is 
that we cannot discern who processes evidence similar to us, and humor remains the best 
avenue for filling this epistemic gap. What it gives us is an approach to epistemic 
                                                             
30 "The Oprah Winfrey Show." February 3, 2006. 
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peerhood that takes strides to soothe the worry that current approaches to epistemic peer 
disagreement are highly idealized and therefore fail to be action-guiding.  
 Recall the opening example of epistemic disagreement. Imagine now that the 
bartender overhears their discussion of trying to remember who asked the really good 
question during the Q&A. The bartender hears Jerry say that he thinks it was Sam, and he 
hears George say that he thinks it was Kevin. The bartender interjects, “Is Sam a man or a 
woman?” “A woman,” Jerry replies. “Well, then you have your answer.” The bartender 
chuckles, and George laughs along. Suddenly, Jerry has learned new information about 
George, namely an underlying gender bias. With this information in hand, it seems 
sufficient for Jerry to in fact demote George as an epistemic peer in which case the 
epistemic peer disagreement dissolves. I hope to have shown that this revealing nature of 
humor gets us closer to answering the question of how we identify our epistemic peers.  
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